State v. Winegar Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42507 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-29-2015
State v. Winegar Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42507
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Winegar Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42507" (2015). Not Reported. 2022.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH MICHAEL WINEGAR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) No.42507 
) 
) Ada Co. Case No. 
) CR-2013-15294 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P. 0. Box 2816 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
FILED· COP 
OCT 2 9 2015 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO COPY STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH MICHAEL WINEGAR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) No.42507 
) 
) Ada Co. Case No. 
) CR-2013-15294 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE PATRICK H. OWEN 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P. 0. Box 2816 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ......................................... 1 
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5 
Winegar Failed To Preserve His Claim That 
The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence 
Of Winegar's Prior Battery Perpetrated On 
Angela Phelps ............................................................................................ 5 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................... 5 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................................... 5 
C. Winegar Waived His Evidentiary Claim 
By Failing To Preserve It.. ................................................................ 5 
D. In The Alternative, Winegar Has Failed 
To Demonstrate That The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion ..................................................................... 10 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 14 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ........................................................ 13 
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) .......................................................... 13 
Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 87 4 P.2d 603 (Ct. App.1994) ......................... 9 
State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 978 P.2d 227 (1999) ........................................... 12 
State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 849 P.2d 942 (1993) ............................................ 6 
State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192,824 P.2d 123 (1991) ............................................ 5 
State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 768 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1989) ........................... 11 
State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 199 P.3d 155 (Ct. App. 2008) ........................ 6 
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 227 P.3d 918 (2010) ....................................... 12 
State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 11 P.3d 494 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................ 5 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) .............................................. 5 
State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993) ....................................... 12 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003) .......................................... 9 
State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 119 P.3d at 660 (Ct. App. 2005) ................ 5 
RULES 
I.C.R. 52 .............................................................................................................. 12 
I.R.E. 103 ........................................................................................................ 9, 12 
I.R.E. 401 ............................................................................................................ 11 
1.R.E. 402 ............................................................................................................ 11 
I.R.E. 403 ............................................................................................................ 11 
I.R.E. 404(b) ....................................................................................................... 12 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joseph Michael Winegar appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery in the presence 
of a child and misdemeanor destruction of a telecommunication device. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In October 2013, Winegar and Angela Phelps, his girlfriend of 10 years, 
were moving personal property to their new residence in Eagle with their two-
year-old daughter, N.W. (Trial Tr., p.117, L.16- p.118, L.24; p.120, L.17- p.122, 
L.5.) Winegar and Phelps were arguing during the day. (Trial Tr., p. 122, L.21 -
p.125, L.8.) At some point, after the argument intensified and Winegar made 
physical threats towards Phelps, Phelps took N.W. and tried to leave the area in 
her truck. (Trial Tr., p.124, L.11 - p.126, L.25.) 
Winegar followed Phelps to the truck and tried to grab the keys out of the 
truck's ignition. (Trial Tr., p.127, Ls.11-16.) Phelps told Winegar that she was 
going to call the police, and Winegar took Phelps' phone from her. (Trial Tr., 
p.127, Ls.11-22.) Then, Winegar punched Phelps several times. (Trial Tr., p.127, 
L.23 - p.128, L.1.) Winegar also grabbed Phelps by her neck, pulled her out of 
the truck, and dragged her behind the house. (Trial Tr., p.129, Ls.8-20.) Phelps 
could "barely" breathe when Winegar's arm was on her neck. (Trial Tr., p.129, 
Ls.21-25.) 
Winegar's mother, who pulled up in her vehicle during the attack, 
intervened and was able to calm Winegar down. (Trial Tr., p.128, Ls.15-25; 
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' p.130, L.19 - p.131, L.2.) Phelps took this opportunity to grab N.W. and run 
down the street. (Trial Tr., p.131, Ls.8-10.) Phelps flagged down a motorist who 
was driving by. (Trial Tr., p.131, Ls.11-13.) Phelps entered the motorist's car 
while Winegar chased her down the street. (Trial Tr., p.131, L.25 - p.132, L.4.) 
Phelps asked the motorist to drive her to a friend's house. (Trial Tr., p.132, 
Ls.10-14.) There, the friend encouraged Phelps to go to the hospital. (Trial Tr., 
p.132, Ls.10-20.) 
At the hospital, the treating physician noted contusions and abrasions on 
Phelps' chest, right upper extremity, right side of her neck, and left ankle. (Trial 
Tr., p.227, L.22 - p.229, L.16.) Phelps was then taken to the FACES Family 
Advocacy Center in Boise. (Trial Tr., p.336, Ls.8-18.) There, a nurse conducted 
a forensic examination on Phelps, during which the nurse noted the abrasions on 
Phelps' body and documented 17 specific injuries. (Trial Tr., p.263, L.3 - p.264, 
L.21; p.267, L.23 - p.268, L.8; p.271, L.1 - p.273, L.19; see also State's Exhibits 
1-43.) 
A grand jury indicted Winegar on charges of felony domestic battery in the 
presence of a child, attempted strangulation, and misdemeanor destruction of a 
telecommunication device. (R., pp.26-27.) Shortly before trial, the state filed an 
amended information which omitted the attempted strangulation charge. (R., 
pp.81-82; Trial Tr., p.8, Ls.7-20.) A jury found Winegar guilty of the other two 
charges. (R., pp.136-137; Trial Tr., p.575, L.8 - p.576, L.11.) Citing Winegar's 
prior history of domestic violence and a domestic violence evaluation which 
concluded that Winegar was a high risk to re-offend, the district court imposed a 
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unified 10-year sentence with two and one-half years fixed for felony domestic 
battery in the presence of a child, and 120 days in jail for destruction of a 
telecommunication device. (R., pp.195-200; 7/30/14 Tr., p.44, L.8 - p.47, L.14.) 
Winegar timely appealed. (R., pp.202-205.) 
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ISSUE 
Winegar states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court commit reversible error by admitting 
testimony regarding unrelated bad acts of Mr. Winegar, in violation 
of Rules 401, 402, 403 and 404 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Did Winegar fail to preserve his claim that the district court erred by 
admitting evidence of Winegar's prior battery perpetrated on Angela Phelps? 
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ARGUMENT 
Winegar Failed To Preserve His Claim That The District Court Erred By Admitting 
Evidence Of Winegar's Prior Battery Perpetrated On Angela Phelps 
A. Introduction 
Winegar contends that the district court erred by permitting the state to 
introduce evidence that Winegar battered Phelps the day prior to the incident 
which led to his arrest in this case. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) Winegar waived 
this claim because he failed to preserve it for appeal. Even if Winegar had 
preserved this claim, he has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused 
its discretion. Finally, even if the district court did err, any such error was 
harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted). 
C. Winegar Waived His Evidentiary Claim By Failing To Preserve It 
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time 
on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1991). 
Further, "[a]n objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different 
basis for excluding the evidence." State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 
119 P.3d at 660, 653 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 
11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000)). 
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Additionally, before an appellant may assert an issue on appeal, he must 
obtain an adverse ruling on that issue from the trial court. State v. Fisher, 123 
Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993) ("We will not review a trial court's 
alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which 
forms the basis for the assignment of error."); State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 
584-586, 199 P.3d 155, 159-161 (Ct. App. 2008) (declining to address merits of 
Huntsman's claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation, where the Court found 
the issue was not preserved due to a failure of counsel to obtain a ruling on 
motion to dismiss). 
In this case, prior to trial, Winegar filed a motion requesting that the court 
permit him to cross-examine Phelps about her methamphetamine use. (R., 
pp.72-73.) In the motion, Winegar asserted that he and Phelps had argued about 
her methamphetamine use prior to the incident which led to Winegar's arrest. 
(Id.) At a subsequent hearing, the district court stated that it had met with the 
parties off the record for "quite some time" to discuss this and other pretrial 
issues. (4/24/14 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-10.) With regard to Winegar's motion to permit 
cross-examination of Phelps on her methamphetamine use and their argument 
on the day of the incident, the court stated: 
And it is my view that what occurred that day would be relevant. 
And so at this point I think both counsel have been made aware that if 
there were arguments that day, what the contents of those arguments 
are about becomes relevant to the trial in this matter. 
At the same time I'm not going to allow in what occurred a week 
before or days before or months before, because I'm concerned about 
confusion to the jury in trying to keep the trial moving on what the 
relevant issues are in the case, and that's whether there was criminal 
conduct on the part of Mr. Winegar on the day in question. 
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(4/24/14 Tr., p.7, L.15 - p.8, L.3.) Winegar did not object to this ruling. 
At trial, consistent with this pretrial ruling, the state questioned Phelps 
about the argument she had with Winegar on the day of the incident. The 
following exchange occurred: 
State: How were things going that day? 
Phelps: That day, not good. 
State: Were you arguing? 
Phelps: Very much so. 
State: What sort of things were you arguing about? 
Phelps: What he had did [sic] to me the night before. 
State: What had he done to you the night before? 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I would object. Can we approach? 
Court: You may. 
(Trial Tr., p.122, L.21 - p.123, L.6.) 
Neither the court nor the parties summarized the content of the 
subsequent bench conference. Following the bench conference, the court did 
not rule on Winegar's objection. (See Trial Tr., p.123, Ls.6-9.) Instead, the state 
resumed its previous line of questioning: 
State: 
Court: 
State: 
Phelps: 
Your Honor, would you like me to ask the 
question again[?] 
Yes, go ahead. 
Okay. And what had happened the night before? 
He wanted to have sex and I didn't, and so it 
became very, very forceful. 
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State: 
Phelps: 
(Trial Tr., p.123, Ls.7-16.) 
Okay. And the next day, were you upset about 
that? 
I was liv[id]. He's supposed to --
Through subsequent questioning, the prosecutor elicited testimony that 
linked the argument between Winegar and Phelps, and Winegar's prior conduct, 
to the growing tension that ultimately led to Winegar's attack on Phelps: 
State: 
Phelps: 
State: 
Phelps: 
State: 
Phelps: 
State: 
Phelps: 
State: 
Phelps: 
State: 
That's okay. As the next day went on, October 
30th , was he doing anything in particular that 
was upsetting you? 
He threw my daughter['s] nebulizer machine 
out on the ground of the -- the thing we were 
staying in, and then he threw some of my 
personal belongings out there as well and he 
ran my stuff over, but her machine didn't get 
hurt because I had picked it up. 
Okay. Was he attempting to touch you 
physically? 
Was he attempting to at the time? 
Yes. 
No, not at that time. 
Was he attempting to kiss you or hug you? 
Oh yes. He was doing that and making jokes, 
and I wasn't in the mood for it. I was very 
upset. 
Were you upset because of what had 
happened the previous night? 
Yes, ma'am. 
As the day went on, was he making any 
threats to you? 
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Phelps: 
State: 
Phelps: 
I'm going to change the words, he was --
You don't have to --
-- he was telling me how he was going to beat me up 
that day, he could feel it coming. 
(Trial Tr., p.123, L.17-p.124, L.16.) 
Winegar failed to preserve his objection to this testimony because he 
failed to obtain an adverse ruling on his objection from the district court. There is 
no indication in the record that Winegar attempted to obtain such a ruling after he 
made his objection, or that the court did anything to prevent or dissuade Winegar 
from doing so. Without such a ruling from the district court, this Court cannot 
entertain the issue. From the context of the record, it is possible that Winegar 
withdrew his objection during the bench conference, or invited the error he now 
alleges. This Court cannot conclude that Winegar preserved the issue based 
upon speculation or supposition as to what may have occurred during a bench 
conference at which no record was made. See Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 
792, 795, 87 4 P.2d 603, 606 (Ct. App.1994) ("It is axiomatic that an appellant 
bears the burden of providing an adequate record to substantiate his or her 
claims before the appellate court.") (citation omitted). 
Winegar also failed to preserve the issue by failing to provide a specific 
ground for his objection. For an objection to be preserved for appellate review, 
either the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of 
the objection must be apparent from the context. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 
267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003); I.R.E. 103(a)(1). In this case, it is not clear 
from the record what the specific basis of Winegar's objection was. Notably, on 
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appeal, Winegar does not attempt to identify the specific basis of the objection, 
and instead asserts that the admission of Phelps' testimony regarding Winegar's 
prior conduct violated Idaho Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404. 1 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) 
Because he failed to preserve his claim that the trial court erred by 
admitting evidence of Winegar's prior conduct, this Court should not entertain this 
issue on appeal. The Court should therefore affirm Winegar's conviction. 
D. In The Alternative, Winegar Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion 
Even if he had preserved this claim for appeal, Winegar has failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Phelps' testimony. For 
many of the same reasons discussed above in the context of the state's 
argument that the issue is not preserved, it is difficult to analyze the merits of 
Winegar's claims on appeal. Winegar failed to create an adequate record or 
obtain a ruling regarding what his specific objection to the evidence was, what 
the court's rationale was for permitting the testimony, or what considerations went 
into this determination. As a result, Winegar cannot demonstrate, on this record, 
that the district court abused its discretion. 
Winegar asserts that the district court should have excluded Phelps' 
testimony on the grounds that it was irrelevant, and that any probative value of 
the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
1 In the event that this Court determines that Winegar's objection preserved 
some issue for appeal, it should not find that Winegar's single unspecified 
objection preserved all of the grounds he now asserts on appeal. 
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(Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. l.R.E. 
401, 402. Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in 
the case, and has any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable 
than it would be without the evidence, is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 
547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). Even if relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403. 
In this case, Phelps' testimony was relevant and substantially probative. 
The growing tension between Phelps and Winegar, and the nature of their 
argument, demonstrated both Phelps' state of mind and motive in fleeing from 
Winegar to the truck, and Winegar's state of mind and motive to pursue and 
eventually batter Phelps. Further, it is clear from Winegar's pretrial motion and 
opening statement that he intended to introduce evidence regarding the content 
of the argument, and to assert that he was attempting to protect N.W. when he 
confronted Phelps at the truck. (See R., pp.72-73; Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.3-18.) The 
state was entitled to challenge this theory of the case with testimony from Phelps 
regarding her recollections of the same argument, and of Winegar's increasing 
hostility towards Phelps which ultimately culminated in the attack. For similar 
reasons, the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial to Winegar. Therefore, even if 
he had preserved this issue, Winegar has failed to demonstrate that the district 
court abused its discretion in concluding that the testimony was relevant, or that 
its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. 
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Winegar also asserts that the district court should have excluded Phelps' 
testimony on the ground that it was intended to demonstrate Winegar's criminal 
propensity in violation of I.R.E. 404(b). (Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) Under l.R.E. 
404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be admitted to prove motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993). 
As long as the evidence is relevant to prove some issue other than the 
defendant's character and its probative value for the proper purpose is not 
substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice, it is not error to 
admit it. State v. Cross. 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). 
As discussed above, it is clear even from the limited record in this case 
that Phelps' testimony in question was relevant for purposes other than 
demonstrating criminal propensity. Specifically, the testimony at issue tended to 
demonstrate Phelps' motive and state of mind that resulted in her fleeing to her 
truck, and Winegar's motive, intent, and state of mind leading up to the attack. 
Finally, even if Winegar had demonstrated that the district court erred, any 
such error was harmless. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " 
I.R.E. 103(a). See also I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."). "The inquiry is 
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the 
defendant] even without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. 
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Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). 
In this case, even if the district court erred, any such error was harmless 
because the evidence of Winegar's guilt was overwhelming. Trial testimony of 
the emergency room physician, FACES nurse, police officers who responded to 
the hospital to investigate the incident, and the motorist who drove Phelps away 
from the scene of the incident all corroborated Phelps' testimony. (See generally 
Trial Tr.) Further, Michael Amelia, Winegar's best friend for over 15 years, 
testified that following the incident, Winegar came to his residence and told him 
that he had gotten "a little rough" with Phelps and had punched her and pulled 
her out of the vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.412, L.14 - p.415, L.21.) Finally, in a 
telephone conversation with his mother that was recorded and admitted into 
evidence, Winegar stated that the incident was not Phelps' fault, and was instead 
a result of Winegar being off of his medications. (State's Exhibit 52, 0:50-3: 1 O; 
Trial Tr., p.442, L.21 - p.444, L.8.) In light of this evidence which corroborated 
Phelps' testimony, a rational jury would have found Winegar guilty of the charged 
crimes even without the admission of Phelps' testimony regarding Winegar's prior 
conduct. Therefore, any district court error in the admission of that evidence is 
harmless. 
Winegar failed to preserve his claim that the district court erred by 
permitting the state to elicit testimony about Winegar's prior conduct. Even had 
Winegar preserved this claim, he has failed to demonstrate that the district court 
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abused its discretion. Finally, even if the district court did err, any such error was 
harmless. This Court should therefore affirm Winegar's convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding Winegar guilty of felony domestic 
battery in the presence of a child and misdemeanor destruction of a 
telecommunication device. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2015. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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